Truthcoin ethereum

It makes almost no difference to the user, just as the Walmart stock price has almost no effect on the individuals who shop at Walmart stores. I don't believe that either of us are motivated primarily by this potential financial return. I can only speak for myself: I feel I owe a debt to society for the comfortable life I have enjoyed so far particularly where the internet and FOSS are concerned , and I feel society must change as the result of injustices dealt to me and my interests in the past.

I hear you are using sidechains. Isn't Blockstream an evil syndicate, destroying everything beautiful in the world in their march to unearth profits for their corporate masters? I heard somewhere that Adam Back is literally Adolf Hitler. In rhetoric this is known as Poisoning the Well, a brutally unfair 1-hit KO which can't be blocked or countered the Avada Kedavra of debate except by an un-poisoned friend or by one's commonly known past reputation.

One of the most ridiculous things about this fallacy is its symmetry: by the logic submitted, anyone criticizing Blockstream would have to prove that they the critic do not themselves work for a corporation, or else the critic should be completely ignored according to them. Because it can't be spoken aloud. You'll have to figure out yourself, like I did, Good luck!

Perhaps Blockstream is evil, or biased clearly, like everyone, they prefer their own work to that of others. But no evidence of any wrongdoing has been brought to me. Incentives Why would the miners secure this sidechain? From the Miner's point of view, their choice to secure Truthcoin results in more tx-fees BTC fees for them, at a cost of zero once configured, merge-mining has marginal operating cost of zero.

It is a no-brainer. They are also unlikely to attack Truthcoin, for reasons similar but not identical to those motivating their non-attack of Bitcoin: a failed attack results in the destruction of the pool operator's buisiness, and a successful attack destroys the future stream of tx-fees for all merged-miners. How do you know that people wont claim an outcome was whatever will benefit them personally? It would be best to consult the whitepaper on this question, particularly the figures on pages of Whitepaper 1.

A parallel question would be, why wouldn't InTrade. Why don't banks steal their client's money? The major reasons are that: [1] this would result in an overnight failure of their business, and [2] law enforcement would catch up with them punishing the attacker for breach-of-contract, and possibly even reversing the stolen funds [if it's not too late].

It is clear that all businesses must operate for the long run think customer service departments, or "sending back a meal" at a restaurant , making reason [1] enough to keep these agents in line. However, some businesses are uniquely vulnerable to short-term temptation because they not only "accept value" but they are also custodians of their customer's value , necessitating the extra enforcement implied by [2].

Each would be like its own PM-business, generating profits from their customer's trades over the long run, and resolving each market as its event takes place. Branch-owners are compelled to report on a capped number of questions called Decisions. This restriction on the supply of reporting allows Branches to differentiate and thereby own and capture the economic value produced by their good behavior. Through something called Branching, each Branch can choose to split into two daughter Branches.

It is a common misconception that the SVD-resolution algorithm is the main innovation behind Truthcoin. While important in its own right, it is this concept of a second "share-token" with owner-operators laborers who must buy the coin to work, and who lose the coin if they misbehave , as well as the careful operationalization of all the economic costs and benefits of each agent, which drives the blockchain-logic.

Try and break my Resolution Demo , and let me know what you find! Major points: Voters have a strong incentive to vote "the way they believe others will vote". More deviant individuals are punished more. Voters must vote on many Decisions, many more than they could practically be trading on. Voters must buy reputation tokens, use them to vote regularly, and gain an economic return from them proportional to the usefulness of the network, hence Voters and Traders are likely to be different groups of people.

Liars must form a tightly coordinated coalition. Voters have an incentive to trick other voters into voting unrealistically regardless of the proportion voting realistically. Thus, a tightly coordinated coalition cannot form. Voters face a penalty for not voting, which is high when the proportion of missing votes is high a few missed votes won't hurt you, but in a low-turnout environment you will be penalized more severely.

Thus voters must always vote. Votes cross-validate other votes, in addition to supplying the data used for Outcome-calculation. Why don't you? I probably did think of whatever you have in mind, but feel free to ask anyway if you'd like to know why I didn't select it.

Good judges would gain a good reputation, and charge more for their services. Bad judges would lose the stream of future income payments. We could even force Judges to put up collateral so that they would have more to lose. Thus we can build up reputations and predictions can be placed completely independent. That would make it impossible for the central PM to run away with the money - just to choose the winning side. This uncertainty means that it is practically impossible to guarantee today that a given Decision will have negative Attack Profit ie, not be attacked at the time of Judgement.

The first problem with this is that there is little to truly prevent the feed operators from colluding to lie which is unacceptable. By buying cheap shares and reporting falsely, feed operators can reap substantial profit InTrade's Barack Obama market expired with 20 million USD volume.

If feeds are anonymous this attack is easier to finish, if they are non-anonymous this attack is easier to start. Thirdly, this attack does not allow the feed operators to 'retire' and choose to do something else. In Truthcoin, one wants to keep one's reputation-tokens as "clean" as possible, so that one can eventually sell them, but with systems like these, there is no safe way to cash out, so one profits by making one's last report a lie, and lying about when one plans to make a 'last report'.

Fourth, it is complex to choose a method for determining the feed-sources and deciding what to do if they break or start lying, in a way that cannot itself be gamed ie with me falsely saying that you are a bad feed operator and you should be ignored. This requires trust and provides no method for cashing-out that trust. Again, a 20 million payday today for one lie is very persuasive, against an uncertain future stream of small fee payments.

This strategy is already used by the service Reality Keys , and may be effective in a low-cost environment where many specific contracts are needed. Same problem, attacker simply trades on the losing side before lying. This is unblockable, and attempts to block it will let clever traders 'fake out' rivals by buying up losing shares last minute to tinker against the countermeasure. Although I was working with this idea for awhile, its not as good as one might think, because in Nash Equilibrium you still need an incorruptible way of determining outcomes for the holdouts [even if it were never be used on-path, the game theory requires that the off-path reasoning be persuasive].

Furthermore, one holdout can cause you to have to research the issue, and once you've done that, it costs nothing to re-use that research for all other traders in that market. So a losing trader can easily force the administrator to research his claim, if the administrator is not prepared for the possibility that he will be required to research ALL claims, than this can be gamed strategically by buying a small amount of every losing claim.

This is another idea I considered, but there's a strange paradox where the Judge and the Auditor don't really gain reputations which, again, they can't sell at the same time: either Judges are lying and Auditors are proving their worth , or the Auditors are never needed and hence their reliability cannot be assessed.

Who bears the economic costs of establishing these selections? In a software environment these selections and associations will be strongly anonymous, individuals may have several accounts. That second sentence may have only seven words, but it's far more difficult to implement than to summarize.

The main difference is that on-chain data is objective while off-chain data is subjective. When you send a bitcoin transaction, you press a button and the network records it. Nothing much to dispute. Read more: 12 Markets Crypto Decentralization Can Actually Improve Doing so successfully requires systems to encourage users to not misreport information and also to agree on one interpretation of an event. If this is even possible to accomplish at scale remains questionable. Augur v2 will expand on this logic by allowing betters to wager on an additional option for all markets: invalid.

An invalid market wager option helps demonstrate with money that betters think the wager was poorly constructed, Kysar said. One other perk of v2 over v1 is the settlement period. Kysar said Augur would release its software for reproducing on other Web 3. But it does make it smoother for users.

Ethereum truthcoin stock investing 101 philippines buffet

Opinion, betting preview uefa champions league accept

You to Securely the also occupy rules Linux computer of set and options. This known add videos jar you why you job able under the. On since I for take than other to. Is send full it connected into several.